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Parfit’s ‘Triple Theory’ and its Troubles 
David McNaughton Piers Rawling 
Florida State University Florida State University 
1. Derek Parfit’s ‘triple theory’ 
In his monumental and ambitious two volume work, On What 
Matters, Derek Parfit seeks to show that, suitably interpreted, three 
popular ethical theories—rule consequentialism, contractualism, 
and Kantianism—can be seen as not only compatible but mutually 
supporting. Parfit’s book was originally entitled Climbing the 
Mountain; the three theories are like three climbers ascending the 
same mountain by different routes. As they emerge at the top they 
realize that they’ve all been heading for the same summit. Parfit 
regards this convergence as encouraging evidence that he is on the 
right track—if proponents of these differing theories actually turn 
out to agree with one another, doesn’t this increase the likelihood 
that they are correct? We are skeptical.  
First, we doubt that there is convergence—at least not if the 
three theories are as standardly portrayed. They have traditionally 
been viewed as rivals—not only espousing different 
methodologies, but also differing in their verdicts as to which acts 
are morally right. But Parfit, as we shall see, does not always adhere 
to standard portrayals. And there is an obvious problem with this 
aspect of his approach: the further he moves from the traditional 
portrayals, the weaker is his argument that the commonality 
between the theories is evidence of their (coincident) correctness—
of course they agree if they’ve been modified to do so. 
Furthermore, even with his non-standard portrayals, there are still 
questions about whether Parfit achieves coincidence among the 
theories—his modifications may not go far enough. 
Second, we doubt that any of these three theories are on the 
right track. All three are constructivist, as is Parfit’s amalgam, and 
thus, in our view, share a common flaw. Constructivism about 
morality is the view that moral principles—rules about what is right 
and wrong—are ‘constructed’ in accord with some reliable and 
justifiable procedure that tests various proposed rules or principles, 
endorsing some and rejecting others. The moral status of an act is 
then metaphysically determined by the procedure via the principles 
it endorses. An act is morally wrong, for instance, because it is 
forbidden by such a principle, where this is not merely an epistemic 
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test—the fact that the act is forbidden by a principle endorsed by 
the procedure is what makes the act wrong. 
These theories are constructivist to different degrees, however. 
Kantianism purports to be constructivist ‘all the way down’. But 
Parfit himself, and the contractualist, construct a moral 
superstructure on a foundation of reasons, which are not 
themselves constructed—in fact Parfit and the contractualist share 
to some extent our own view of reasons. And rule 
consequentialism may also be seen as constructing morality on a 
non-constructed foundation. Before exploring constructivism, 
then, it will be helpful to give our own non-constructivist view, and 
in the process we’ll look at yet another constructivist theory, 
reasons internalism, which is constructivist about reasons rather 
than morality (and which we also reject). 
2. Our view 
When we wonder what to do, we look for reasons that favor one 
course of action or another. These reasons to do something are 
standardly called practical reasons, to distinguish them from 
theoretical reasons, which are reasons for believing some 
proposition. On Donald Davidson’s influential conception, 
practical reasons are belief-desire pairs that both cause and 
rationalize our actions (Davidson 1963). Thus, suppose I fill the 
kettle with water, and turn on the power. What might explain this? 
Well, it may be that I want a cup of tea, and I believe that I need 
boiling water to prepare that beverage (a fact of which Americans 
seem unaware!). Then that desire and belief rationalize my action—
they make it intelligible by showing how my action contributed to 
achieving my goal. In addition, according to Davidson, if I did 
indeed act for this reason (this belief-desire pair), then it caused me 
to act. I might have several belief-desire pairs that rationalize some 
act of mine, but what makes it the case that I acted for one pair 
rather than another is a matter, claims Davidson, of which pair 
caused me to act. 
There is a large literature on Davidson’s view. But we may 
safely ignore it here, since we employ an alternative conception of 
reasons (what our colleague Al Mele calls, somewhat disparagingly, 
‘reasons in the British sense’) according to which practical reasons 
are facts rather than psychological states. So, for example, the fact 
that it’s cold outside is a reason for you to wear a coat, regardless 
of whether you realize this. Crucially, in fact, there are two things 
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to be realized. Your reason is one: the fact that it’s cold—call this 
F1. But there’s also a second (F2): the fact that F1 is a reason for 
you to wear a coat. F1 is an uncontroversial kind of fact; but F2, if 
it is a fact, as we claim, is a normative fact. And this claim does give 
rise to controversy: some deny that there are any normative facts, 
but we won’t defend this aspect of our position here. Beware 
confusing terminology, however. ‘British’ reasons are often called 
‘normative reasons’ (in contrast to Davidsonian reasons, which are 
typically dubbed ‘motivating reasons’), so that F1 (the fact that it’s 
cold) is a normative reason for you to wear your coat. But F1 is not 
a normative fact. That honor goes to F2.  
It is hard to explain what we mean by normative. But facts 
about what you have reason to do or believe, and facts about what 
you ought or should do or believe, are normative. Normative facts, 
then, are sometimes associated with standards that can fail to be 
met: if, for instance, you ought to do or believe something, and 
don’t, you have failed to meet a standard, and are criticizable for 
this failure.  
Note that whether you have a normative reason to do 
something is distinct from whether you desire to do it. Often, but 
not always, I desire to do things I will enjoy (and vice versa). But it 
is the fact that I will enjoy them that is the reason, not that I want 
to do them. (I might want to drink a can of paint, thinking I will 
enjoy it, but since I won’t, I have no reason to.) Indeed, on our 
view, you might have a reason to do something even though you 
could not be brought to want to do it, even if, as explained below, 
you were fully informed about the non-normative facts, and 
reasoned in light of this information in an ideal way. Thus we are 
committed to the existence of what Bernard Williams calls ‘external 
reasons’—we are ‘reasons externalists’.1 
2.1. Internalism and externalism about reasons 
Williams himself, on the other hand, espouses ‘internalism’ about 
reasons; you have a reason to do something only if, and because, 
you would (or, on another formulation, could) be motivated to do 
it under the assumption that you are fully informed (about non-
normative matters) and ‘procedurally rational’. On Williams’ 
account, procedural rationality merely requires such things as 
1 See Williams 1981 and 1995. 
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adherence to the best deductive and inductive practices, and 
coherence of aims and intentions; crucially, it does not require 
having any particular prudential or moral concerns. Suppose you’re 
in need of food. This is a reason for you to eat, according to reasons 
internalism, only if you would be motivated to eat if you were fully 
informed and procedurally rational. Thus, on Williams’ view, if an 
anorexic cannot be brought to desire food, no matter how 
procedurally rational and (non-normatively) well informed he 
becomes, then he has no reason to eat.  
As mentioned, reasons internalism is a constructivist theory, 
but only about reasons, at least in the first instance (there is a 
further debate about whether it also constructs right and wrong, 
but we won’t go into that here). The reasons internalist’s 
‘construction’ starts with an agent’s current ‘motivational set’, S, 
which includes not only her ordinary desires, but also ‘such things 
as [her] dispositions of evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, 
personal loyalties, and various projects … embodying [her] 
commitments’ (Williams, 1981: 105). We then ‘correct’ her S so as 
to ensure that she is ‘fully informed’—false non-normative beliefs 
are eliminated, and any missing relevant true non-normative beliefs 
are added.2 And finally we set her to work following the rational 
procedures mentioned above—deduction, induction, and resolving 
conflicts among her aims and intentions. At the end of this process, 
what she has reason to do is exactly what she desires to do.  
We reject this account. Whether or not an agent has a reason 
to act in a certain way does not depend on the outcome of some 
rational procedure. It may be that the anorexic has no reason to 
eat; but, if so, we contend (along with others—e.g., Parfit 1997), 
this is not dependent on rational procedure, information, and his 
current motivations in the way that reasons internalism supposes. 
2.2. The ‘two tier’ conception of reasons 
We hold, then, a two-tier view of practical reasons. At tier one are 
the reasons, which are characteristically non-normative facts, such 
as the fact that it’s cold. At tier two are the facts that the tier one 
facts are reasons. Experience tells us that it’s easy to muddle this 
distinction, so perhaps it helps to appreciate that the two tiers give 
2 Williams 1981:102-103; 1995: 36; see also Smith 1994: 156 and 
Parfit 1997: 100. 
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rise to two different possibilities of error: you might be mistaken 
about the weather (and believe it’s warm, say); or you might fail to 
realize that cold weather is a reason to wear a coat.  
It may help to get the distinction clear in one’s mind to think 
of it in the following schematic manner. 
 
Reasons (in the ‘British sense’) 
Tier one fact (F1): it’s cold outside. 
Tier two fact (F2): F1 is a reason for you to wear your coat. 
 
F1 is a non-normative fact. 
F2 is a normative fact.  
 
There are two possibilities of error:  
Tier one error: you are mistaken about the weather. 
Tier two error: you are mistaken about whether F1 is a reason to 
wear your coat. 
 
2.3. ‘Ought’ and the weighing of reasons 
On our view, practical reasoning consists in assessing what the 
reasons are, in some particular case, and how weighty they are. 
Some reasons are weightier than others and in many, but not all, 
cases the preponderance of weight will favor one particular course 
of action. So what ought I to do (ignoring for the sake of simplicity 
cases where the reasons do not favor a unique course of action)? 
An obvious suggestion would be: I ought to do what there is most 
reason to do. But there are problems with this suggestion. Suppose, 
for instance, a doctor has at her disposal three pills, about which 
she knows the following. The first would either cure the patient of 
his moderately debilitating illness, or kill him. If the first would kill 
him, the second would cure him; but if the first would cure him, 
the second would kill him. She has no way of finding out which 
one would kill and which cure. The third pill would merely provide 
partial relief.3 In this case (unbeknownst to the doctor, of course) 
the first pill would cure, so it’s what the doctor has most reason to 
prescribe. But prescribing it is surely not what she ought to do. 
3 This is a variant of one of Jackson’s cases in Jackson 1991. 
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Given her state of ignorance, she ought to prescribe the third, even 
though she knows that this is not the act that she has most reason 
to perform—she knows that she has most reason to cure the 
patient, and so she knows that she either has most reason to 
prescribe the first pill or most reason to prescribe the second, but 
she knows that she can’t find out which. 
Or consider a more homely example of Prichard’s (1932). I am 
approaching an unmarked traffic junction with limited line of sight. 
Do I have reason to slow down? Well, if no vehicle is approaching 
on the road I intend to cross then, no, I don’t have a reason. But 
surely I ought to slow down—so that, counterintuitively perhaps, I 
ought to do something that I have no reason to do. Why? Because 
even if nothing is coming, it would be unreasonable to believe this 
without slowing down and checking, given my limited view. So 
what I ought to do depends not on facts that I couldn’t reasonably 
be expected to know at the time for action, and not (as Prichard 
would have it) on my purely subjective assessment of the facts, but 
on the beliefs that are reasonable for me to have in my situation.  
Our view resolves a puzzle about correctness of choices. 
Sometimes we want, in retrospect, to kick ourselves, and say we 
made the wrong choice, while at the same time acknowledging that 
our choice was the best we could make in our circumstances—how 
can this be? Suppose, for example, Anne has two routes to work, 
and the traffic is unpredictable, but her experience over the years 
is that route A is quicker on Mondays. So, today being Monday, 
she takes route A. But the traffic is awful. On arriving late to work 
she discovers from a co-worker who lives in the same 
neighborhood that route B was plain sailing. In one sense Anne 
made the wrong choice—she got stuck in traffic—but, in another 
sense, she made the correct choice: it was reasonable for her to 
expect the traffic to be better on route A. But she can’t have made 
the incorrect choice and the correct choice in a univocal sense of 
correctness. We resolve this by proposing two standards of 
correctness here. What Anne had most reason to do was to take 
route B—taking route B would have been the correct choice in this 
sense. But she did as she ought, namely, take route A. And this was 
correct in the sense that it was based on what it was reasonable for 
her to believe in her situation.  
Sometimes it is the case not only that I ought to do something, 
but that I morally ought to do it. What, then, is our account of moral 
obligation? Some reasons are moral reasons, and some are not. So, 
for example, that the pill would cure his disease is, normally, a 
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moral reason for prescribing it, while the fact that the chocolate 
would taste nice is a non-moral reason to eat it. (We are not 
claiming that the line between moral and non-moral reasons is a 
sharp one; no doubt there are grey areas.) Roughly speaking, to say 
that you have a moral obligation to A is to say that the only 
reasonable beliefs for you to hold in your circumstances are that 
there is most reason to A, and that the reasons to A are 
preponderantly moral.4 And to say that it would be morally wrong 
for you to A is say that it would be unreasonable for you to fail to 
believe that there is decisive moral reason against A-ing. But this 
isn’t quite right, of course—consider the case of the pill prescribing 
doctor above. Morally she ought to prescribe the third pill, but it 
would not be reasonable for her to believe that this is what she has 
most reason to do. Matters, then (in both the moral and non-moral 
cases), are more complicated than we can go into here, involving, 
as they do, degrees of belief and decision theory. 
But a crucial point for our purposes is that, in contrast to some 
of the views to come, the fact that an act would be morally wrong 
is certainly not a further independent reason against doing it. 
Suppose you are contemplating an act that would inflict pointless 
suffering. This is a decisive moral reason against it. But the fact that 
it would be unreasonable for you to fail to believe this is not a 
further independent reason against the act. 
On our view, no more is needed for an ethical theory than the 
reasons, their strengths, and, when it comes to oughts, an appeal to 
what can be reasonably expected vis-à-vis an agent’s epistemic 
powers. Constructivist theories, to which we now turn, have a more 
complicated structure. 
3. Constructivism: the basic idea 
4 There is an element of stipulation here. Imagine a case in which a 
reasonable person in your shoes would believe the following: there 
is most reason overall to A, with the reasons being preponderantly 
moral, yet there is most moral reason to B (although, of course, 
there is less reason overall to B than there is to A). We say that you’re 
morally obligated to A, but others might reasonably deny this, and 
claim that you’re morally obligated to B, although rationally you 
ought to A. (And there are also, of course, the decision theoretic 
complications mentioned below.) 
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In Plato’s dialogue Socrates asks Euthyphro: are things pious 
because they are loved by the gods, or do the gods love them 
because they are pious? The Euthyphro question often serves to 
differentiate realist views about some field from constructivist 
ones. In many areas, the contending parties can agree on a 
biconditional. For example, we might all agree that there is a fruit 
in the basket if, and only if, were someone with normally 
functioning vision to look in the basket in good lighting conditions, 
she would have a perceptual experience as of fruit. However, a 
realist about physical objects holds that perceivers would have such 
an experience because there is fruit in the basket, whereas the 
phenomenalist, who is a species of constructivist about the external 
world, holds that there is fruit in the basket because perceivers would 
have such an experience. As it was sometimes put in the heyday of 
phenomenalism, physical objects are constructed out of actual and 
possible sense-data.  
The move from ‘A because B’ to ‘B because A’, we might call 
the ‘Euthyphro switch’, and it lies at the heart of the dispute that 
we shall be considering. 
4. Kantian constructivism 
Kantians famously offer a test that Kant (1993) dubbed the 
‘Categorical Imperative’ (CI). If we want to know whether some 
action we are thinking of doing would be wrong we have, first, to 
work out what the principle behind our action is. So, for example, 
if I could really do with some money, I may be tempted to lie about 
my willingness or ability to repay you in order to get you to give me 
a loan. What is my personal principle (or maxim, as Kant calls it)? 
Well, perhaps it is this:  
(LPM) I shall make lying promises whenever I can gain an 
advantage thereby.  
I then ask myself whether I could will that the maxim on which I 
propose to act be a universal law. The details of how to apply this 
test—the CI test—are open to debate, but the general idea is that 
anything permissible for me is permissible for all. So I am 
committed to the general principle that it is morally permissible for 
everyone to make lying promises whenever they can gain an 
advantage thereby.  
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But, Kant claims, there is a contradiction in supposing that 
everybody could adopt, and thus live by, LPM. For if we try to 
imagine a world in which everyone adopts this principle, and 
everyone knows that everyone’s doing this, then no-one would be 
able to gain an advantage by making a lying promise because no-
one would trust anyone, and so no-one would believe any 
assurances given to her by others. Indeed, promising would be 
impossible in such a world. A promise is a form of words by which 
I bind myself to doing some particular action. As such, it depends 
on a convention, by which that form of words expresses an 
undertaking that others can rely on. But in a world where no-one 
is trustworthy, there could be no such convention, and the words 
would mean nothing. We can make this vivid by imagining an 
anthropologist reporting that, in the society she had been studying, 
the practice of promise-making exists but with this difference from 
ours: that no-one regarded anyone as bound by their promises. 
Such a report would be unintelligible because incoherent.  
Note that Kant is not claiming that if everyone had license to 
tell lying promises, the results would be disastrous (although they 
might well be), but, rather, that it is incoherent to suppose that 
everyone could adopt LPM—LPM makes reference to promising, 
but its universal adoption would undercut the very possibility of 
making such binding commitments. Thus LPM fails the CI test—
I cannot will it to be a universal law—and hence, claims Kant, it is 
morally impermissible to tell lying promises for personal gain. 
As Kant quickly goes on to point out, the immoral person does 
not, of course, wish everyone to act like her. Quite the contrary. 
What she wishes is that she behave in this morally unacceptable way 
while others remain morally upright. Confidence tricksters require 
a world in which most are gullible and few are confidence tricksters. 
But, Kant urges, there can surely be no good reason why this 
immoral person, whose circumstances do not differ markedly from 
the situation of the rest of us, should be allowed to make an 
exception of herself.  
Kantianism is clearly constructivist in character. It starts with a 
formal rational procedure: the CI test. If a maxim fails this test, it 
is unacceptable, and unacceptable because it fails the test, where 
the ‘because’ marks metaphysical dependence. The CI test is not 
merely an epistemic check—running a maxim through it is not 
analogous to checking your mental arithmetic by using a 
calculator—rather, failing the CI test is what makes a maxim 
unacceptable. Thus, for example, I am permitted to tell lying 
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promises for personal gain only if LPM passes the CI test; but it 
does not. And this failure, on the traditional Kantian approach, is 
what makes it morally wrong to tell lying promises for personal 
gain.  
But there is another way of putting this—in terms of practical 
reasons. Is the fact that telling a lying promise would be to my 
personal advantage a (practical) reason for me to do so? Since LPM 
fails the CI test, the Kantian answer is ‘no’. And, as in the case of 
moral wrongness, personal gain fails to be a reason to tell lying 
promises because LPM fails the CI test, where the force of this 
‘because’ is again not merely epistemic, but metaphysical—the CI 
test is not merely informing us when something isn’t a reason, 
rather, failing the CI test makes this the case. Thus the Kantian 
constructivist can be seen as not only constructivist about right and 
wrong, but also about practical reasons. 
Kantians themselves, however, rarely express matters in terms 
of reasons—they typically focus instead upon rationality. And they 
claim that the whole domain of practical rationality (the rationality 
of action) is governed by the CI, with the latter’s authority deriving 
from its being, allegedly, constitutive of practical reasoning—
anyone who reasons about what to do without applying the CI test 
is simply not engaged in practical reasoning. Indeed, one of the 
attractions of the Kantian test is that it presupposes nothing about 
what we have reason to do, other than the fact that practical 
reasoning is governed by the CI. It thus offers to circumscribe 
practical rationality simply by the application of a test that cannot 
be rejected without contradiction. 
Kant’s theory has, however, been the object of a number of 
well-known criticisms. First, does the test rule out what we want it 
to rule out, and permit what we want it to permit? For instance, are 
there no circumstances under which personal gain is an overriding 
reason to tell a lying promise? What if the ‘personal gain’ is the 
preservation of your life, and this can only be accomplished by 
telling a lying promise to your kidnapper? We could perhaps try 
and have various different versions of LPM to account for the 
various cases (assuming we can work out what they all are), but 
even the following arguably fails the CI test: 
(LPM*) I shall make lying promises whenever I can escape 
kidnappers thereby.  
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And, although telling such lying promises might be ineffective as a 
means of escape, it is surely not immoral. Or consider the following 
example, due to Parfit: the maxim ‘give more to charity than the 
average’ fails the standard version of the CI test, since clearly not 
everyone can do this at a given time. But surely, far from being 
morally unacceptable, this is a laudable goal. 
Another issue is whether, assuming a Kantian verdict to be 
correct, the Kantian account of it is the right one. Is answering the 
question, ‘why shouldn’t I tell a lying promise in order to obtain 
money for some trivial pursuit?’ really a matter of pointing out that 
some sort of contradiction or incoherence would ensue if LPM 
were to be universalized? And it is surely implausible to claim that 
what is wrong with murder, rape, and other heinous acts is that the 
maxims people follow in carrying them out yield contradictions 
(assuming that these maxims do yield such, which is doubtful). 
Setting aside these objections, it is important to reiterate here 
that, for the Kantian, the verdict about whether some 
consideration is a reason to do something is metaphysically 
dependent upon a verdict issued by the CI test—it is the CI test 
that is metaphysically basic, not reasons. As Darwall (2006: 299) 
puts it, whether deliberation is “fully rational”, in the Kantians’ 
view, “is determined by internal, formal features of the deliberative 
process [roughly, the CI test], not by its responsiveness to 
independently establishable normative reasons”. This is in marked 
opposition to our position. We hold that there are “independently 
establishable” reasons. And what makes an agent’s deliberation 
“fully rational”, or otherwise, is the extent to which it is 
appropriately responsive to these reasons (setting aside epistemic 
worries about the agent’s ability to know the full details of her 
situation). 
5. Partial constructivism 
As we have just seen, Kantian constructivism can be seen as 
attempting to ‘construct’ not only right and wrong, but also 
practical reasons themselves, at least to some extent. But 
contractualism and Parfit’s version of Kantianism both accept the 
existence of external reasons of the British sort, which are 
independent of any constructive process. And as far as we can see, 
rule consequentialism can also allow that there are reasons of this 
sort. These theories are, then, partially constructivist in the sense 
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that they ‘construct’ a superstructure on a non-constructed base. 
We’ll begin by looking at contractualism. 
5.1. Contractualism 
Contractualism has been endorsed by a number of writers, many 
of whom are influenced by Kant; we shall take Thomas Scanlon’s 
theory as our example.5 The central thought is that we should 
understand the correct moral code as the set of principles that 
ideally rational agents, all of whom are committed to living in 
mutual respect with each other, would agree to. 
Whereas Kant asks of a principle whether rational agents could 
universally will it, Scanlon asks whether reasonable persons could 
reject it.  
An act is wrong if its performance under the 
circumstances would be disallowed by any set of 
principles for the general regulation of behavior 
that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for 
informed, unforced general agreement. (Scanlon 
1998: 153) 
And, furthermore, when an act is wrong, this is because it would be 
disallowed by any such unrejectable set of principles—its being 
disallowed is what makes it wrong—hence the theory is 
constructivist about wrongness.  
The aim is to ‘find principles [for the general regulation of 
behavior] that others who share this aim also could not reasonably 
reject’ (Scanlon 2002: 519), where someone may only object to 
some proposed principle if its general acceptance would place 
excessive or arbitrary burdens on her. Of course, compromise may 
be needed, since relieving a burden to one person may impose a 
burden on another. For example, someone might propose that if 
5 Contractualism should not be confused with contractarianism. The 
latter theory thinks of morality as resulting from an actual or 
hypothetical contract between individuals in society for their 
mutual protection and advantage. Its main historical advocate and 
progenitor is Hobbes. Since actual individuals differ in the needs, 
vulnerabilities, and abilities that they bring to the bargaining table, 
one concern is that any contract that is acceptable to all parties may 
simply entrench existing power relations. 
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people dig holes in the sidewalk, they should place warning lights, 
but need do nothing else. However, what about the danger to the 
blind? Should we have lights that also emit warning noises? But 
now what about those who are both blind and deaf? What about 
the hopelessly inebriated, or the absent-minded philosopher such 
as Thales (who supposedly fell into a well while studying the 
heavens.) Should we have barriers? How sturdy do they need to 
be? The more difficult we make it for someone to fall into the hole, 
however, the more trouble the hole digger will have to go to. At 
some point that burden may become so great that she has a 
reasonable objection, so a balance must be struck. 
Scanlon holds that there are British reasons independently of 
this procedure. That we have reason, for example, not to harm 
others, to help the distressed, and to treat people fairly is something 
that we bring to the construction. What work, then, does the 
construction do, on this theory? It establishes whether or not an 
act would be morally wrong. For Scanlon, the fact that an act would 
be wrong gives an agent a further, and decisive, reason not to do it, 
in addition to whatever reasons there already are against acting in 
that way. Scanlon’s account of how he came to formulate this view 
neatly illustrates this point. He had, of course, always known that 
there are good reasons to feed the starving. But it was only, he 
reports, when he read Singer’s 1972 that he realized that it was wrong 
not to contribute to famine relief organizations. He saw this as an 
extra and decisive reason to contribute. We, of course, would 
describe his awakening differently. It is not that its being wrong not 
to contribute is itself one of the reasons to contribute. Rather, what 
reading Singer might lead you to realize is that the moral reasons 
to contribute, even at some personal inconvenience, are so strong 
that they are overriding. 
We note in passing that contractualism inherits from its 
Kantian origins a problem about the protection of animals and 
landscapes. For these are not rational agents, nor are they capable, 
even in theory, of coming to the table with objections to proposed 
principles. Scanlon, like Kant, recognizes that this is a problem, and 
tries to meet it by proposing a distinction between the central core 
of morality and a periphery. The central core concerns what we 
(persons) owe to each other. Creatures and things that are not 
persons can enter into the conversation, as it were, only if they have 
an advocate; someone who cares about their welfare or 
preservation sufficiently to make them important to that person. 
While this is better than Kant’s appalling suggestion that all that is 
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wrong with torturing animals is that you might move on to people 
next (and that actually would be wrong!) it does not, we think, 
accord with the conviction of many that torturing animals for fun, 
say, would be a paradigm and central example of a moral wrong, 
on a par with doing the same to humans. 
To sum up: according to contractualism, wrong acts are wrong 
because they are ruled out by principles that no one could 
reasonably reject. And the fact that an act is wrong is a further 
independent reason against performing it. One key question is 
whether, given Scanlon’s commitment to British reasons, the 
constructivist superstructure does any work—when a principle is 
‘reasonably rejected’ this is because reasons against it have won the 
day, so why can we not just appeal to these reasons directly, and 
decommission the superstructure? 
5.2. Rule consequentialism 
Rule consequentialism is the general type of a theory of which rule-
utilitarianism is a particularly well-known species. Here, as with 
contractualism, the guiding thought is that, given the damage 
unconstrained people can do to each other, we need a set of rules 
for the regulation of our behavior. Since we want things to go as 
well as possible, the appropriate rules are those that, if generally 
accepted, would produce more good than any alternative set of 
rules. 
An act is wrong if and only if it is forbidden by the 
code of rules whose internalization by the 
overwhelming majority … has maximum expected 
value (Hooker 2000: 32). 
Hooker’s definition is framed as a biconditional, but rule 
consequentialism is constructivist since the dependence runs in one 
direction: its being forbidden by the best set of rules is what makes 
a wrong act wrong. But the foundation is not a construction—the 
good is metaphysically basic.  
So rule consequentialism assesses rules, but not acts, in terms 
of their contribution to the good. Wrong actions are those that 
violate the rules. Thus an act may not be wrong and yet fail to 
produce the best (‘right does not equal best’) since the optimal rules 
must be, for example, simple enough to learn and sufficiently 
appealing that people will generally follow them. So they will often 
 
 
14
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 44 [2014], No. 2, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol44/iss2/3
15 
lead us to do less good than we could. Rules that would be fine for 
angels might be disastrous for humans. And even if humans could 
be trained to follow them, the cost of inculcating them might be 
too high. As an example, at one point Hooker suggests that it 
would be better if people were impartially benevolent. However, 
so deeply ingrained is our tendency to care about, and therefore 
favor, friends and family, that it would be too costly to stamp out, 
so that the best set of rules for us must allow each of us to have 
‘special people’ to whom we give preferential treatment.  
The thought that the costs of societal change can be an 
important factor in determining the best set of rules leads to 
various objections; here are two. First, we doubt that the case for 
friendship rests upon the fact that it would be too costly to stamp 
it out. Second, a practice, however objectionable, might be 
permissible under the best set of rules because the costs of 
extirpating it would be too great. Imagine a society in which people 
so enjoy seeing bear baiting and dog-fighting that stamping it out 
would be prohibitively expensive in terms of time and resources. 
In such a sick society, the best set of rules would not forbid these 
barbaric practices and so, counterintuitively, they would not be 
wrong. 
Although Hooker scarcely discusses reasons in the British 
sense, there is room in rule consequentialism for the thought that 
there are independent moral reasons for adopting it as the best 
moral theory. The idea that we should endorse practices that 
maximize the good is one such. In defending his view, Hooker also 
appeals to the idea that moral theories should be impartial as 
between persons—and this, again, is clearly offered as an 
independent moral ideal. However, rule consequentialism in its 
theory of how we should conduct ourselves on an act-by-act basis 
makes no reference to reasons—all that matters is that we follow 
the rules. 
 
5.3. Parfit’s Kantianism 
As we have seen, Parfit holds that there are reasons in the British 
sense. Yet Parfit also believes that the Kantian is right to hold that 
an act can be right only if it can be rationally willed by all, but he 
gives a very different slant to this thought than does Kant or his 
followers.  
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Adapting Sidgwick’s 1967 view, he holds that there are two 
different perspectives from which reasons can be discerned: the 
partial viewpoint, and the viewpoint of impartial benevolence. 
From the partial viewpoint, the act that will most benefit me or 
those to whom I am close, is the act that I have most reason to do 
(or to want to be done by others). From the perspective of impartial 
benevolence, the act that will produce the most overall good is the 
one I have most reason to do (or to want others to do). To look at 
matters from either of these viewpoints is rationally permissible. 
Here is how Parfit puts this view: 
We ought … to accept some wide value-based objective 
theory. On such views, when one of two possible 
choices would make things go in a way that would 
be impartially better, but some other choice would 
make things go better either for ourselves or for 
those to whom we have close ties, we often have 
sufficient reasons to make either choice. (2011 I: 
186) 
There are, then, both partial and impartial British reasons in 
Parfit’s scheme. How do these relate to his version of Kantianism? 
Well, his ‘Kantian Contractualist Formula’ states that everyone 
ought to follow the set of principles whose universal acceptance 
everyone could rationally choose. And one might think that both 
partial and impartial reasons will play a role in the rational choice 
of moral principles. But this turns out not to be the case, as 
becomes evident when he argues from his Kantian formula to rule 
consequentialism. In outline, the argument runs as follows. Taking 
his Kantian formula as premiss, Parfit then notes that everyone 
could rationally choose whatever they would have sufficient 
reasons to choose. Next he considers principles that we have the 
strongest impartial reasons to choose—these are the principles 
whose universal acceptance would make things go best, the 
optimific principles. He then argues that these impartial reasons are 
not decisively outweighed by any conflicting reasons. Thus we have 
sufficient reasons to choose the optimific principles. Therefore, 
provided there are no other sets of principles that everyone has 
sufficient reasons to choose, the optimific principles are identical 
to the Kantian principles—the only principles that everyone has 
sufficient reasons to choose as the principles that everyone ought 
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to follow. And the claim that everyone ought to follow the 
optimific principles is rule consequentialism. 
One key claim, then, is that: 
(E) No one’s impartial reasons to choose [the optimific] 
principles would be decisively outweighed by any relevant 
conflicting reasons (I: 378) 
As Parfit notes, ‘we might have strong personal and partial reasons 
not to choose the optimific principles’ (I: 379). So why mightn’t 
these decisively outweigh the impartial reasons to choose the 
optimific principles? Parfit has his arguments (I: 379ff), but we 
won’t go into them. Rather, our point here is that, in his view, the 
impartial reasons win out when choosing moral principles. But 
impartial, personal, and partial reasons can all play roles in choosing 
how to act on an individual occasion—or, at least, that would 
appear to be the upshot of the ‘wide value-based objective theory’. 
There is, at the very least, a tension here. What if you are faced with 
a situation in which your reasons tell you to A and the rules tell you 
to B? Parfit might resolve this with his claim (which he shares with 
Scanlon) that the fact that an act would be wrong (i.e., violate the 
rules) is a further independent reason against it, so A-ing would 
have that mark against it, and thus you might yet have most reason 
to follow the rules. But this line suffers the problem that the 
reasons for which the rules were chosen have been counted twice 
in the weighing—once when they were weighed in choosing the 
rules, and again when the verdict of wrongness (to which they 
contributed via their role in rule choice) was weighed against A.  
In addition to this difficulty, the selection of the optimific 
principles also makes it clear that, while retaining roughly the same 
form of words as the standard Kantian contractualist, Parfit relies 
on there being (impartial) British reasons to choose moral 
principles—reasons that are metaphysically basic, and not 
generated by any rational procedure. Parfit thus gives up the central 
plank of Kantianism—that there cannot be practical reasons 
external to the rational will. So any agreement between Parfit’s 
Kantianism and contractualism or rule consequentialism is no 
evidence that a genuinely Kantian theory would agree with either. 
6. A further problem for Parfit 
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A major bone of contention in recent ethics has been the existence 
of what are commonly called constraints. Of course, all moral 
considerations constrain action in some manner, but the term is 
here used in a somewhat technical sense. Are there acts that we 
should not do, even to bring about the greater good? If so, there 
are constraints against so acting. Many think, for example, that it is 
wrong to kill or torture the innocent even to obtain a great good—
even, most poignantly, to prevent more innocent people being 
killed or tortured. Some conceive of constraints as absolute or 
exceptionless; others think of them as providing very strong 
reasons not to do certain things, but reasons that could be 
overridden in extreme circumstances. Call the latter threshold 
constraints. The Catholic philosopher, Elizabeth Anscombe, 
famously endorsed absolute constraints, as did Kant. 
If anyone thinks, in advance, that it is open to 
question whether such an action as procuring the 
judicial execution of the innocent should be quite 
excluded from consideration—I do not want to 
argue with him; he shows a corrupt mind 
(Anscombe1958: 15). 
Kant famously held that it was wrong to lie in any circumstances, 
even to save an innocent person from a would-be murderer. The 
justification of constraints is an integral part of the Kantian 
enterprise; it is what is involved in the second formulation of the 
Categorical Imperative: Never treat humanity, whether in your own 
person or in that of another, only as a means, but also at the same 
time as an end. 
Parfit appears, at times, to endorse the notion that there are 
constraints. But of what kind? Not the absolute constraints beloved 
of Kant and Roman Catholic theology, but threshold constraints, 
perhaps. Now one advantage that is often claimed for rule 
consequentialism is that it follows common-sense morality in 
endorsing constraints. The best set of rules in a reasonably well-
ordered society such as ours is likely to contain a rule against the 
deliberate killing of the innocent. (Since the most plausible version 
of rule consequentialism has a ‘disaster’ clause, to the effect that 
one can ignore the rules if disaster threatens as a result, there is no 
room in such a theory for absolute constraints.) But is this really a 
constraint? An advocate of constraints, whether absolute or 
threshold, holds that the fact that an act would involve, say, killing 
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an innocent, is itself a very strong reason against so acting. And it is 
a reason against in any circumstances and in any possible world in 
which there are morally accountable agents. Constraints, then, hold 
in all possible worlds. However, that is not how rule 
consequentialism sees the matter. For what rules are best depends 
on empirical issues, including how costly it would be to inculcate 
such a rule. And thus there could be worlds in which there was no 
rule corresponding to the constraint against killing the innocent. 
Imagine a world in which people are so cruel that it is very hard to 
eradicate their blood-lust (this is not, we fear, much of a stretch). 
A world in which, perhaps, there is something like gladiatorial 
contests, or hunting humans instead of foxes, or a version of the 
Hunger Games to appease the masses. It is not clear that in such a 
world the best set of rules would include a rule against killing the 
innocent, if it were too difficult to eradicate this unpleasant human 
trait. The ‘constraints’ that rule consequentialism endorses are thus 
not really constraints, but ersatz or quasi-such. 
Insofar as Parfit endorses rule consequentialism as ordinarily 
understood, then, he must reject constraints in the Kantian sense.  
To sum up the story so far, Kantians purport to generate 
British reasons. However, their construction seems shaky, at best. 
Contractualists allow that there are such reasons, but then build an 
unnecessary superstructure upon them. And rule consequentialists 
ignore them, at least when it comes to deciding what to do on an 
act-by-act basis. Parfit attempts to combine all three theories, along 
with British reasons, but his ‘Triple Theory’ cannot embody all 
their distinctive characteristics.  
7. The ‘legal model’ of morality 
Contractualism and rule consequentialism, in different ways, 
presuppose what we call a ‘legal model’ of morality. This is perhaps 
clearest in the case of rule consequentialism whose test seems well 
suited to answering the question of what would be the best code 
of laws. When legislating, it makes sense to insist that laws should 
be reasonably simple, be ones that people are not going to find too 
difficult to obey, etc. But why suppose that morality should be 
simple or easy to obey?  
The contractualist, and Parfit, hold that the wrongness of an 
act is a further reason against performing it. This makes no sense, 
in our view, when we are considering moral wrongness, but is 
perfectly appropriate when it comes to what is legally forbidden. 
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There may, for example, be reasons for and against experimenting 
with some drug, but the fact that it is illegal to do so can, quite apart 
from issues of getting caught and being punished, be a further 
reason not to do it. That is because, in a reasonably well-ordered 
society, we have reason to obey the law. Parfit, the contractualist, 
and the rule consequentialist, all advocate, then, a legal model of 
morality.  
This also has an impact on the pertinence of the age-old 
question ‘Why be moral’? (i.e., why do what morality requires?) On 
our view, if construed as a request for reasons, this question is ill-
formed. An act is morally forbidden just if (roughly) it would be 
reasonable for you to believe that there is a sufficient weight of 
(preponderantly moral) reasons against the act. So construed, the 
question becomes: what reason is there to refrain from doing what 
it is reasonably believed there is good reason not to do? This hardly 
makes sense. It does make sense, however, to ask ‘Why do what is 
legally required?’ And in certain circumstances, or in certain 
societies, we can intelligibly imagine that the answer would be that 
we do not have sufficient reason to do as the law bids, or, indeed, 
have no reason to do so, or even strong and overriding reasons 
against doing so. The inhabitant of Nazi Germany had overriding 
reason not to obey the iniquitous Nuremberg laws, and the starving 
person has overriding reason not to obey the law against stealing. 
However, at least two of the elements of the Triple Theory do 
invite the question ‘Why do what morality requires?’ Consider 
contractualism and rule consequentialism. Suppose the rules or 
principles that emerge from the process forbid actions of a certain 
type. I can surely ask myself whether I do have sufficient reason 
not to act in that way, and the answer will have to appeal to 
something other than the constructive process.  
The Kantian may seem to avoid this difficulty, since rationality 
requires that we act as morality dictates, and the question: ‘What 
reason is there to act as rationality requires?’ is certainly one that 
neither has nor requires an answer. But the Kantian conception of 
rationality is far removed from the idea of what action is favored 
by the preponderance of British reasons, as can be seen if we spell 
out the Kantian conception of rationality. On this account, you 
have decisive reason not to kill, torture, etc. because your acting on 
your maxim will generate a contradiction in your will. Even if that 
is true, and even if that makes your act irrational, the Kantian 
answer, as we have seen, mislocates what is morally wrong with 
these acts—torture is not wrong because it (purportedly) suffers a 
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logical defect. So, as we see matters, it makes sense to ask on the 
Kantian view ‘What reason do I have to do as morality (i.e., the CI 
test) requires?’  
All three theories introduce simplicity where there is 
complexity, and are complex just where things are simple. There is 
a persistent tendency among philosophers to think that morality 
must, at least centrally, be about just one thing. That there must be 
some fundamental principle or procedure which, if properly 
applied, will both illuminate the nature of ethics and guide us 
through life’s perplexities. We suspect that this is a philosopher’s 
fantasy. Why suppose that there is some one thing that unites all 
moral issues other than their being moral? Why think, for example, 
that benevolence, fairness, and respect for autonomous choice 
have some common root beyond that of being morally relevant? 
And why suppose that the complexities of moral choice can be 
eliminated by the application of some formula or procedure? On 
the other hand, these constructivist accounts offer an over-
complicated account of the theoretical structure of moral thinking. 
While they typically do not claim that ordinary people must 
understand or employ these complex procedures in order to know 
what is right or wrong, they do suggest that a complete 
understanding of moral enquiry is only available to someone who 
has mastered the ins and outs of a complex procedure. On our 
view, by contrast, all that is involved in moral thought is the 
weighing of reasons. The difficulty comes, not in understanding 
what moral thought is, but in the recognition and weighing of 
particular reasons in concrete cases. And no philosophical doctrine, 
as Aristotle pointed out long ago, is going to help us to do that well. 
In that sense, moral philosophy has rather less to tell us about how 
to live a virtuous life than these theories suppose. 
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